The evolution of bargaining under austerity : political change in contemporary French and German labor-market reform by Vail, Mark I.
MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/10
The Evolution of Bargaining under Austerity
Political Change in Contemporary French and  
German Labor-Market Reform
Mark I. Vail
Mark I. Vail 
The Evolution of Bargaining under Austerity:  
Political Change in Contemporary French and German Labor-Market Reform
MPIfG Discussion Paper 07 /10  
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln  
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne  
October 2007
MPIfG Discussion Paper 
ISSN 0944-2073 (Print) 
ISSN 1864-4325 (Internet)
© 2007 by the author(s)
Mark I. Vail is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tulane University, New Orleans.
mvail@tulane.edu
MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed 
disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowl-
edge. The papers can be ordered from the institute for a small fee (hard copies) or downloaded free of 
charge (PDF).
Downloads  
www.mpifg.de  
Go to Publications / Discussion Papers
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung  
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies  
Paulstr. 3 | 50676 Cologne | Germany
Tel. +49 221 2767-0  
Fax +49 221 2767-555
www.mpifg.de  
info@mpifg.de
Abstract
This paper examines the relationship among economic context, political institutions, 
and the political dynamics of adjustment within national models of capitalism through 
an analysis of recent labor-market reform in France and Germany. It argues that a cli-
mate of economic austerity since the 1970s, combined with the political legacies of ear-
lier policy-making models and their failure to confront the challenges of slow economic 
growth and high rates of unemployment, have led to qualitative shifts in the incentives 
facing government officials and key interest groups. These shifts have produced new 
patterns of politics – “competitive interventionism” in France and “conflictual corpo-
ratism” in Germany – within generally stable formal institutional configurations. The 
paper explores the implications of the French and German experience for scholarly un-
derstandings of policy making in advanced industrial societies in a climate of economic 
austerity and how it differs from policy making under conditions of prosperity. In light 
of this analysis, it calls for a rethinking of prevailing conceptions of the relationship be-
tween formal institutional structures and the dynamics of bargaining and state–society 
relations across varying economic and historical contexts.
Zusammenfassung
Anhand der Analyse der jüngsten Arbeitsmarktreformen in Frankreich und Deutsch-
land diskutiert dieses Papier den Wandel nationaler Kapitalismusmodelle vor dem 
Hintergrund von wirtschaftlichem Kontext, politischen Institutionen und politischen 
Dynamiken der Anpassung. Im Kern wird argumentiert, dass sich die Präferenzen von 
Politikern und Repräsentanten der Interessengruppen verschoben haben. Diese Präfe-
renzverschiebungen beruhen auf dem Klima wirtschaftlicher Austerität seit den 1970er 
Jahren, verbunden mit der Erblast früherer Politikmuster und deren mangelnder Fä-
higkeit, den Problemen langsamen Wachstums und hoher Arbeitslosigkeit gerecht zu 
werden. Daraus resultierten neue Politikmuster, die im Papier als „kompetitiver Inter-
ventionismus“ (competitive interventionism) im Falle Frankreichs und „konfliktärer 
Korporatismus“ (conflictual corporatism) im Falle Deutschlands umschrieben werden. 
Das Papier diskutiert allgemeine Implikationen dieser Befunde für das politökono-
mische Verständnis von Wirtschaftspolitik unter sich verändernden Randbedingungen. 
Insbesondere geht es dabei um das Verhältnis zwischen formalen institutionellen Kon-
figurationen und den Dynamiken politischer Aushandlung zwischen staatlichen und 
gesellschaftlichen Akteuren.
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Introduction
The emergence of the so-called “new institutionalism” during the 1970s marked a wa-
tershed in the study of institutions in the comparative-politics and comparative-polit-
ical-economy literatures, breaking from the functionalist approach favored by the be-
havioralism of the first two postwar decades.1 One of the central insights of this work, 
now widely accepted among scholars of comparative politics but innovative at the time, 
is that national institutional configurations structure politics and policy trajectories in 
distinct ways, producing enduring approaches to conducting the business of politics.2 
Though with varying points of emphasis, scholars in this tradition have argued that 
the distribution of political authority among national political-economic institutions 
tends to produce relatively stable political relationships among key actors, such as trade 
unions, employers’ associations, and government ministries, which lead to relatively 
predictable patterns of political interaction. According to this view, political dynamics 
are heavily influenced by “the distribution of power among the key social groups” (Hall 
1986: 231–232), which defines the extent to which specific actors are able to influence 
policy.3
During the past three decades, which have witnessed the proliferation of studies of po-
litical institutions from a variety of analytical and epistemological perspectives, the ap-
proach that has followed most closely from the “new-institutionalist” tradition is what 
has come to be known as “historical institutionalism.”4 This diverse body of work has 
emphasized the enduring power of historical patterns of development to structure and 
configure contemporary politics and, accordingly, rejects predictions of convergence 
upon a narrow range of political-economic arrangements. The 1970s and 1980s wit-
nessed the rise of two other competing traditions – “rational-choice” and “sociological” 
institutionalism (Hall/Taylor 1996). The former emphasizes how institutional contexts 
structure individual-level decision making and patterns of political interaction by pre-
senting individuals with clear sets of incentives and payoffs. The latter, by contrast, fo-
cuses largely on institutions or social and/or cultural norms, treating institutions as 
contextual variables leading individuals and organizations to seek “to define and express 
their identity in socially appropriate ways” (Hall/Taylor 1996: 949). In a strand of work 
that borrows heavily from neoclassical economics, the earlier work of Douglass North 
The author would like to thank Raymund Werle for his assistance in bringing this paper to publica-
tion; Sabina Avdagic and Michel Goyer for their helpful suggestions for revisions; and the researchers 
and staff at the Max Planck Institute for creating such a warm and vibrant intellectual community.
1 As Robert Adcock points out, however, behavioralism was not as ahistorical – nor “new institu-
tionalism” as revolutionary – as many scholars have argued. See Adcock (2007).
2 Classics in this tradition include Katzenstein (1985), Hall (1986), and Zysman (1983).
3 Such concepts as state “strength” and “weakness,” prevalent in the resurgence of studies of the 
state in the 1980s and 1990s, reflected such an approach. See Migdal/Kohli/Shue (1994), and 
Evans/Rueschemeyer/Skocpol (1985). 
4 Though it refers to an older intellectual tradition, the first and best-known systematic use of 
the term “historical institutionalism” can be found in Steinmo/Thelen/Longstreth (1992). For a 
discussion, see Adcock/Bevir/Stimson (2007: 279–80).
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and scholars of the “new institutional economics” have shown how formal institutions 
structure political and economic behavior by creating “rules of the game,” often in ways 
that are far from efficient but are relatively regular and predictable.5
Though these approaches provided essential correctives to the behavioralist approach, 
which tended to divorce politics from its historical and institutional contexts, one of 
their limitations derives from their focus upon enduring, and largely formal, institu-
tions and their effects. This orientation has led scholars to see the “rules of the game” of 
politics as relatively stable and, therefore, as reliable predictive and explanatory guides 
to national patterns of policy making. Though studying institutional configurations in 
this way gives us a good idea of the formal distribution of political authority, it does 
not necessarily tell us (and at times even provides a very misleading image of) how that 
authority is exercised in varying national, historical, or economic contexts. The “rules 
of the game” of politics are often as much implicit as explicit, are subject to shifting in-
terpretations by social and political actors, and therefore may change significantly over 
time, even in the absence of major changes in a country’s formal institutional and/or le-
gal structures.6 Though the distribution of authority deriving from formal institutional 
configurations is a key determinant of patterns of political bargaining, these dynamics 
may also be heavily influenced by changing economic contexts, the legacies of past con-
flicts among key social and political actors, and political actors’ shifting interpretations 
of their own interests, as well as those of their allies or competitors. In a way to which 
existing institutionalist analyses are relatively insensitive, economic contexts thus pro-
vide “lenses” through which interests are reinterpreted and may alter the ways in which 
political authority is (or is not) exercised, as well as the often shifting and informal co-
alitions that support or impede certain kinds of policy outcomes.7
This paper offers a conception of the influence of national political institutions on pat-
terns of politics in advanced industrial democracies that privileges such contextual fac-
tors. It argues that shifts in economic context from prosperity to austerity drive changes 
in the informal political relationships and prevailing interpretations of political and 
economic interests facing key actors. In so doing, it seeks to explain how patterns of 
political bargaining, informed by both formal distributions of authority and shifting 
informal coalitions among key political actors, drive reform and economic adjustment. 
5 Whereas North’s earlier work emphasized the effect of formal institutions on economic behav-
ior, related work by Powell and DiMaggio has stressed their influence on political strategies and 
interests. See North (1990), and Powell/DiMaggio (1991). 
6 To use an American football metaphor, even though the “rules of the game” have remained rela-
tively stable, the “playbook” employed by key political actors has changed significantly, as have 
the ways in which that playbook is deployed. 
7 In this respect, my approach significantly extends Pierson’s (1996) insight that the politics of 
welfare reform are different from those of postwar welfare expansion. Whereas Pierson focuses 
upon how a changing policy agenda alters the relationship between the state and interest groups 
that have grown up around specific benefits, my concern is with how a shifting economic con-
text alters the incentives and relationships among a wide array of political actors.
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This approach entails both a broader and more dynamic conception of politics and the 
process of economic reform than that afforded by prevailing institutionalist scholar-
ship, which tends to underestimate the influence of contextual factors and to privilege 
formal distributions of political authority as the determinants of bargaining dynamics 
and policy outcomes. By contrast to such work, this paper contends that the changing 
dynamics of politics flows in significant part from alterations in its relational and inter-
pretive aspects, rather than merely from the (relatively inertial) distribution of authority 
expressed in formal institutional configurations or constitutional arrangements.
Such an approach shares much with what Peter Hall has called “systematic process anal-
ysis,” in which small-N comparisons and historical analysis shed light on the dynamic 
relationships among political structures (Hall 2003). It places greater emphasis, howev-
er, on the contingent character of those relationships and their mediation by contextual 
and interpretive factors, which a focus on structural variables alone cannot illuminate. 
An analysis of recent French and German labor-market reform shows that shifts in the 
dynamics of national models of policy making tend to occur against a background of 
enduring economic crisis (indicated by high levels of unemployment and slow eco-
nomic growth) and in the wake of earlier, failed attempts to manage adjustment, which 
discredit inherited arrangements and dominant actors within them. These shifts in bar-
gaining dynamics are supported by durable changes in public opinion and political 
discourses that provide increasing support to liberalization and reform. Together, these 
factors drive actors’ reinterpretations of their economic interests and reevaluations of 
their political strategies, and, over time, lead to the emergence of new reform coalitions 
and bargaining dynamics, often with profound effects upon policy outcomes.8
This paper develops this argument through an analysis of recent French and German 
labor-market reform, an area that has been marked by a high degree of policy activism 
and political conflict since the 1980s. During the postwar boom, French and German 
labor-market policy developed in ways that were broadly consistent with the two coun-
tries’ prevailing patterns of national politics. In dirigiste France, labor-market regula-
tion was dominated by the state, while in neocorporatist Germany the social partners 
were the predominant actors. Since the advent of economic austerity in the late 1970s, 
however, these patterns have changed, most dramatically within the past decade. In 
France, statism has given way to what I call “competitive interventionism,” a pattern 
in which the state and social partners compete for dominance over both the reform 
agenda and the substance of policy outcomes. In Germany, by contrast, the decline of 
consensual gradualism, predicated upon a diffuse distribution of political authority, 
has yielded a model of what I term “conflictual corporatism,” characterized by a much 
more influential, aggressive state and increasing conflict between governments and so-
cial partners. These shifts in bargaining dynamics have been particularly dramatic in 
8 As I discuss below, this process of reconfiguration of dominant political coalitions is similar, 
though not identical, to what Thelen calls institutional “conversion.” See Thelen (2004: 36), and 
Streeck/Thelen (2005: 26–29), for a discussion.
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the area of labor-market policy due to the political salience of unemployment in Conti-
nental Europe, voters’ perception of it as an index of officials’ competence in managing 
economic adjustment, and, as a result, the high stakes of success or failure in promoting 
adjustment in this policy domain.
In the following section, I provide a brief assessment of existing institutional analysis 
and studies of institutional change for the purpose of understanding changing pat-
terns of political interaction. I argue that understanding and explaining such changes 
requires careful attention to shifts in implicit, relational distributions of authority and 
to the effects of changing economic context upon key actors’ interpretations of their po-
litical and economic interests, as well as to the shifting bargains and alliances that such 
perceptions underpin. I contend that the character of changes in prevailing bargaining 
dynamics will be mediated by existing institutions, particularly the discrediting of old 
arrangements in the wake of failed attempts at economic adjustment. This process of 
discrediting in turn leads to the development of new reform coalitions, as once-margin-
al political actors step in to exploit the loss of credibility and power by previously domi-
nant actors and public perceptions of the exhaustion of older models. I then describe 
recent French and German labor-market reforms, highlighting the effects of changing 
economic contexts since the 1970s and shifts in associated political incentives and their 
effects on both prevailing political dynamics and policy outcomes. I conclude with a 
brief examination of the theoretical significance of the French and German stories and 
promising avenues for future research on political institutions and their role in govern-
ing economic adjustment in advanced industrial democracies.
Politics, institutions, and the shifting dynamics of bargaining under austerity
The proliferation of “new institutionalism” in the 1970s built upon an innovative post-
war literature on “national models” of capitalism. This approach argued that countries’ 
trajectories of postwar growth were driven by unique institutional configurations and 
the policy strategies that flowed from them. The seminal work in this tradition was 
Shonfield’s Modern Capitalism, which described how Britain, France, Germany, and the 
United States devised novel political-economic institutions that replaced the penury 
and destruction of the war with prosperity and economic renewal (Shonfield 1969). 
This scholarship departed from earlier, descriptive work on political institutions and 
rejected the premises of Parsonian structural-functionalism, an American synthesis of 
Weber and the neopositivist agenda of behavioralism in which “systems” rather than 
“institutions” were the central concepts (Hall/Taylor 1996: 937–38). By contrast, schol-
ars such as Shonfield demonstrated that modern capitalist economies were based upon 
distinct national configurations of political and economic institutions which yielded 
enduring, and relatively predictable, patterns of political interaction. For Shonfield and 
Vail: The Evolution of Bargaining under Austerity 9
his intellectual heirs, it was the enhanced role of public policy that placed institutions at 
the center of analysis, as authorities across Western Europe developed new and power-
ful institutions with which to transform and guide their economies. Indeed, for Shon-
field, it was not merely the case that “modern capitalism” was characterized by a “vastly 
increased influence of the public authorities on the management of the economic sys-
tem” (Shonfield 1969: 66), but that the essence of the postwar order was largely defined 
by this influence.
This perspective directed scholars’ attention to the new distributions of power among 
revamped political-economic institutions and led to the assumption that relationships 
among key political actors and their respective influence over policy outcomes would 
flow from that distribution. In France, for example, a highly centralized and powerful 
state apparatus gave rise to an insular process of economic planning, the exclusion of 
weak and fragmented trade unions, and the neglect of economic actors such as shop-
keepers and small-business owners. In ways that were consistent with this institutional 
configuration, French economic policy was governed by a “conspiracy in the public 
interest” between the state and the powerful business groups that together served as the 
vanguard of a rapid and transformative process of industrialization (Shonfield 1969: 
131). In Germany, by contrast, a “semi-sovereign” state and powerful producer groups 
gave rise to a consensual, gradual policy-making process in which the state was, at best, 
first among equals.9 In both countries, however, the character of politics was thus seen 
to flow predictably from their respective constellations of political authority.
Though the work of Shonfield and the later “new institutionalism” that he helped to 
inspire provided critical insights into the varied character of national models of capi-
talism during the postwar era of rapid growth and full employment, it has proven less 
well-suited for understanding the climate of slowed growth and rising unemployment 
that has prevailed since the 1970s. When growth rates were high and few people were 
out of work, the exercise of public authority was considered to be, and often was, consis-
tent with the public good. As the economies of Europe and the United States stagnated 
in the 1970s, however, the very institutional configurations that had been credited with 
postwar success would increasingly be blamed for their failure. As a result – and as the 
near-Revolution of May–June 1968 in France made clear – “weak” and marginalized 
political actors with little recourse to the official levers of power could exert significant 
influence over policy and politics, acting as members of negative coalitions that could 
transform the character of national political debates.
A second, more general limitation of the new-institutionalist paradigm derived from the 
fact that it was relatively static and insensitive to changes in political dynamics. Because 
one of its central insights was that the formal distribution of power and the manner of 
9 The phrase “semi-sovereign state” is Peter Katzenstein’s (1987) but is consistent with a broad-
er literature on “consensual” German politics. See Manow/Seils (2000), and van Kersbergen 
(1995). For more sceptical interpretations, see Vail (2003); and Green/Patterson (2005).
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its exercise were mutually consistent, this scholarship was poorly equipped to explain 
the exercise of other, less formal kinds of power, such as public protest, or to show how 
political actors’ shifting interpretations of their economic interests might alter their po-
litical strategies. Though institutionalist scholarship has adopted a certain conception 
of political contingency, this conception has remained relatively thin and provided a 
limited understanding of the extent to which stable institutional frameworks can pro-
duce widely varying patterns of political interaction as economic contexts evolve.10 The 
emphasis on “institutions as patterned relations” (Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 12), in other 
words, has tended to privilege the “pattern” over the “relation,” thereby limiting its ca-
pacity to explain changes in relationships among political actors like those that have 
taken place in France and Germany. Recent work on path-dependence (for example, 
Pierson 2004) has provided an important theoretical rationale for this approach but, in 
the process, has further limited its sensitivity to shifts in political dynamics.
Other approaches to institutional analysis remedy some of these shortcomings but suf-
fer from their own limitations for understanding evolving patterns of political bargain-
ing. For example, rational-choice institutionalism shows “how institutions constrain 
the sequence of interaction among the actors, the choices available to particular actors, 
the structure of information, and the payoffs to individuals” (Weingast 2002: 661). Con-
sistent with its kinship with neoclassical economics, this approach tends to see political 
interactions as the products of an institutionally-based environment of incentives in 
which the relevant actors seek to maximize their political or economic resources. Some 
work in this tradition, particularly scholarship in New Institutional Economics, does 
recognize that institutions and the decision-making context faced by political actors 
vary by place and time, that institutions create both formal and informal constraints on 
human behavior, and that the information available to political actors is necessarily in-
complete (North 1990). More recent work in the rational-choice-institutionalist tradi-
tion has likewise backed away from earlier assumptions of fixed preferences and rational 
calculation independent of context, incorporating some of the insights of historical-in-
stitutionalist work by attending “more systematically to historical and institutional pro-
cesses to better understand how actor preferences have been fashioned and how institu-
tions have introduced biases or other distortions” (Katznelson/Weingast 2005: 6).11
That said, both new institutional economics and rational-choice institutionalism enjoy 
a limited ability to account for diachronic, systematic changes in national political dy-
namics. Even recent scholarship in this tradition continues to understate the degree to 
which political actors may be influenced by the history of their relationships with other 
actors or by shifting perceptions of their own and others’ interests. More important, 
the centrality of rationality to such accounts and their assumptions about the avail-
10 The Varieties-of-Capitalism approach of Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001) provides a recent 
and stark example of the apolitical tendencies of this approach. 
11 For an excellent, if complex, study of how economic incentives are mediated by history, see Greif 
(2006).
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ability of relevant information limit their receptiveness to how the informal influence 
of particular political actors changes over time, often in ways that formal institutional 
configurations can neither predict nor explain. In both the French and German cases, 
policy-making dynamics have shifted in large part because of the failures of established 
modes of regulation and policy making to confront a new set of economic challenges. As 
these failures have discredited existing arrangements, historically weak actors have been 
able to gain influence over the policy-making process by presenting themselves as more 
credible agents for reform and exploiting public cynicism about older arrangements. 
Clearly, this pattern does not reflect a process in which actors rely exclusively upon their 
constitutionally-based levers of power according to calculations of rationality.12
An often overlooked but important body of work that has grappled with the relation-
ship between economic context and political dynamics is the so-called “Regulation 
School.” Regulationist scholars argue that capitalist economies and the institutional ar-
rangements that underpin them vary from one stage of development to the next (Boyer 
1990), leading to changes in the adjustment strategies of governments and their relation-
ships with social and economic actors (Howell 1992: 9–10). Though such an approach 
points in fruitful directions for understanding this relationship, its emphasis upon the 
economic determinants of political-economic institutions leads it to underestimate the 
dynamic potential of political relationships within a given “mode of regulation.” To the 
extent that such work does recognize the potential for political change, moreover, it 
tends to adopt a relatively functionalist understanding that sees both the structure of 
political institutions and the dynamics of politics as predictable outgrowths of under-
lying economic factors. Though this approach helps us to understand the structural 
relationship between economic context and institutional configurations, it offers little 
insight into how politics may change within such a context or into the political mecha-
nisms through which such change occurs.
Recent work on institutional change in comparative politics and political economy has 
provided a more fruitful approach to understanding the relationships among changing 
economic context, shifting interpretations between key political actors, changing reform 
coalitions, and policy outcomes. In so doing, it has provided an important corrective for 
both the functionalist tendencies of the Regulation School and the overly static perspec-
tive adopted by traditional historical-institutionalist approaches. It recognizes multiple 
types of institutional change, which need not occur only at “critical junctures” of rapid 
transformation, but may instead take place gradually over time. Wolfgang Streeck and 
12 The second influential alternative to historical institutionalism is the “sociological” variant, 
which shares much in terms of its approach to institutions with organizational theory (Powell/
DiMaggio 1991, ch. 1). Whereas rational-choice institutionalism sees politics as the collective 
product of individual-level, and largely rational, decisions, this approach views political dynam-
ics as the complex vector of evolving relationships that are reshaped by evolving economic and 
institutional environments. This approach recognizes the informal and contextual influences of 
institutions on political behavior and the fact that political dynamics should be understood as 
responses to a set of evolving social and economic contexts.
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Kathleen Thelen, seminal authors in this emerging literature, see its central analytical 
purpose as exploring “a wide but not infinite variety of modes of institutional change that 
can meaningfully be distinguished and analytically compared” (Streeck/Thelen 2005: 1, 
emphasis in original). They seek to identify “incremental change with transformative 
results” (Streeck/Thelen 2005: 9), and to explore how “institutions can be transformed 
in subtle but very significant ways through a variety of specific mechanisms” (Thelen 
2004: 35). For the first time, a significant body of work in the historical-institutionalist 
tradition has brought a systematic focus to bear on how and why institutions change 
and adapt, rather than merely on why they endure. In partial contrast to the Varieties-
of-Capitalism approach, which sees political economies as characterized by long-term 
institutional stability (Hall/Soskice 2001), this work sees institutions as continually 
evolving, through “an evolutionary process that unfolds in an incremental manner and 
without major disruptions over long periods of time and resulting in profound change” 
(Goyer 2006: 402). The shifts in political coalitions and bargaining dynamics described 
in this paper echo Thelen’s concept of “institutional conversion,” or “the adoption of 
new goals or the incorporation of new groups into the coalitions on which institutions 
are founded [which] can drive change in the functions these institutions serve or the 
role they perform” (Thelen 2004: 36).13
This work provides an excellent starting point for such an analysis by loosening the rela-
tively structured, formal understanding of the link between institutions and the pur-
poses to which they are put, explicitly recognizing that “an institution’s effects can occur 
without fundamental shifts in formal institutional structures” (Hacker 2005: 42), and 
acknowledging that “major change in institutional practice may be observed together 
with strong continuity in institutional structures” (Streeck/Thelen 2005: 18). That said, 
understanding changes in national-level political dynamics requires that we extend this 
approach. Its focus, as well as the outcomes that it seeks to explain, continues to relate to 
changes in particular policies and institutions, rather than the broader political dynam-
ics that shape outcomes across a range of policy contexts.14 In part, this limitation de-
rives from the literature’s focus on formal policies and institutions, an approach that is 
consistent with the traditional understanding of institutions in comparative politics as 
“the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that struc-
ture the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” 
(Hall 1986, quoted in Deeg 2005: 172), or as “regimes” governing the relationships be-
tween “rule makers” and “rule takers” (Streeck/Thelen 2005: 13–14). Accordingly, this 
approach tends to divert attention from how institutions can have varying informal 
effects on politics across different economic contexts and how actors’ understandings 
of their own and others’ political and economic interests can change, often in ways that 
13 For an earlier, somewhat briefer formulation of the concept of institutional conversion, see 
Thelen (2003: 228–230).
14 Exceptions to the traditional emphasis on formal institutions can be found in recent work on 
Central and Eastern Europe, where political and economic arrangements are assumed to be 
more contingent and fluid. See Avdagic (2006) for an example.
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are profoundly important for how the business of politics is conducted and the kinds of 
policy outcomes that it produces. 
In the remainder of this paper, I explore recent reforms in French and German labor-
market policy as a way of showing how such factors can reshape policy outcomes and 
the political coalitions behind them. I argue that a focus on formal distributions of 
political authority, consistent with venerable images of “statist” France and “neocorpo-
ratist” Germany, obscures important changes in political dynamics in the two countries. 
The shifting economic environment since the 1970s has reconfigured the economic and 
political incentives facing the state, trade unions, and employers’ associations, as have 
these actors’ dynamic interpretations of their interests in light of the legacies of past 
conflicts and policy trajectories. These changes have given rise to new political coali-
tions and patterns of political contestation that have led to policy outcomes that the 
“statist” and “neocorporatist” paradigms are unable to explain. Understanding recent 
changes in patterns of French and German political bargaining and the emergence of 
new coalitions in support of reform require an analysis of how the enduring economic 
and employment crises of the 1990s shifted prevailing discourses by discrediting older 
arrangements and engendering greater public support for new kinds of policy solu-
tions. These case studies show that, even in the presence of stable formal distributions 
of political authority, the exercise of that authority can change and, in the process, sig-
nificantly reshape reform trajectories.
The rise of “competitive interventionism” in French labor-market adjustment
By the late 1980s, an enduring climate of economic austerity and high rates of un-
employment had placed labor-market reform at the center of French political debates. 
The previous decade and a half had witnessed economic stagnation that led to soaring 
unemployment rates, which reached over 12 percent in the mid-1990s. Once thought to 
be ungovernable if the number of unemployed exceeded a million, France in 2000 con-
fronted 2.5 million jobless citizens, with sluggish growth offering little hope for future 
improvement. The state’s failure to address France’s most salient economic problem 
and the political legacies of the insular dirigiste model led to the emergence of a new 
model of labor-market governance. In the 1980s and 1990s, the combination of rising 
unemployment and the state’s failure to confront it opened up political opportunities 
for it to assume a more important role in the policy-making process. In the 1995 presi-
dential election campaign, Jacques Chirac famously promised to “heal France’s social 
fracture,” exhibited by the exclusion of large numbers of unemployed French citizens 
from the fruits of economic prosperity. Not only did Chirac’s government fail to deliver 
on this promise, but rates of unemployment actually continued to rise, reaching nearly 
12 percent by 1997 and apparently immune to the effects of renewed economic growth 
(La documentation française 2002: 48). As the state once again failed to revitalize the 
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French economy, voters grew increasingly impatient with the established model of 
statist labor-market regulation, particularly in the wake of high-profile layoffs by such 
mainstays of the French economy as Michelin and Moulinex.15 By the late 1990s, the 
enduring employment crisis and shifts in public perception of the acceptable scope of 
reform, combined with a reevaluation by the government and social partners of their 
economic interests and political strategies, led to the emergence of a pattern of com-
petitive interventionism. In this model of political bargaining, the state has remained 
an important player but has had to compete with the social partners in both setting 
the reform agenda and defining policy outcomes. Though characteristic of a number 
of other policy domains, these new dynamics have been most salient in the area of 
labor-market policy, due to the centrality of unemployment as a political issue and the 
social partners’ institutionalized influence over the administration of policy in this area 
(Palier 2000 and 2002).
As France’s continuing labor-market woes discredited the statist model, they reshaped 
the political incentives facing the state and social partners and led each of these key ac-
tors to draw different conclusions about their political and economic interests. Public 
demands on the state to address unemployment have led governments to seek out al-
lies among France’s producer groups, particularly employers, who must create jobs if 
unemployment is to be reduced. These demands, coupled with the state’s tarnished im-
age as a responsible economic steward, have given employers a political opportunity to 
push an agenda of labor-market liberalization and to exert a significant influence over 
the direction of policy making. Among moderate, reformist unions such as the CFDT, 
the priority has shifted from protecting benefits to reducing unemployment, in order 
both to increase their potential membership and to improve the job security of their 
existing rank and file. The result of these shifting priorities has been the emergence of a 
new, implicit reform coalition among employers, moderate trade unions, and officials 
in relevant ministries, all of whom have made reducing unemployment a top prior-
ity. Though they have often disagreed over the details of policy change, a consensus 
has emerged among them that reform is necessary, leading to a willingness to consider 
relatively liberal, market-conforming policy proposals, such as reductions in the gen-
erosity of unemployment benefits, that simply would not have been politically viable 
two decades ago. Indeed, when the CNPF, MEDEF’s predecessor as the main French 
employers’ organization, pushed for a similar program of liberalization in the 1980s, 
it only partially succeeded, and then only in the presence of a friendly center-Right 
government under Jacques Chirac. Ultimately, both the program of liberalization and 
employers’ influence on policy were short-lived (Levy 1999: 66–69), largely because the 
state was still seen as primarily responsible for directing reform.
15 By 1997, only 54 percent of French citizens said that they were “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with 
their employment situation and the security of their job, a figure about equal to that of British 
citizens surveyed (57 percent) but much lower than the analogous figures for Denmark and 
Austria (70 percent). These figures reflect French voters’ impatience with existing labor-market 
arrangements, despite the quite strict regulations on labor contracts and layoffs (La documenta-
tion française 2006: 92).
Vail: The Evolution of Bargaining under Austerity 15
In the late 1990s, by contrast, the fact that high rates of unemployment had endured for 
so long, coupled with shifts in the interpretive frameworks of the state and social part-
ners, led to a more structural change in the dynamics of policy making and the relative 
influence of key political actors. The development of this new model of labor-market 
policy making gained momentum in the late 1990s, when MEDEF launched its so-called 
Refondation sociale, or “Social Refoundation” campaign. This agenda involved liberaliz-
ing reforms in the areas of unemployment insurance, vocational training, health insur-
ance, and pensions. In addition to influencing public debates and reform outcomes, the 
campaign also reflected MEDEF’s attempt to combat what both employers and unions 
viewed as the government’s excessive intrusion into labor-market policy, which MEDEF 
argued should be the exclusive purview of the social partners. In the words of then-
MEDEF president Ernest-Antoine Seillière, “Of course, the state has social responsibili-
ties, but that does not mean that it should carry them out in an authoritarian way, with 
sole regard to its own initiative” (Seillière 2000).16 For Denis Kessler, the intellectual 
father of the Refondation, the campaign involved a “quest for rules” governing social 
dialogue and a correction of state dominance of a process that had been intended to 
remain within the shared purview of unions and employers (personal communication, 
15 May 2002). The open battle over labor-market reform that launched MEDEF’s Re-
fondation was thus not merely a fight over policy content, it was also a conflict over the 
legitimacy of the government and the social partners and their respective roles in the 
policy-making process. 
In 2000, the dynamics of a major debate over unemployment insurance reform pro-
vided a salient indication of the evolution of French policy-making dynamics, marked 
by increasing conflict between MEDEF and the government and the emergence of coali-
tions in support of reform. In an effort to accomplish a meaningful reduction in jobless 
rates that were still hovering around 9 percent, in June 2000 MEDEF and the reformist 
union CFDT agreed to limit access to benefits and to impose significant new obligations 
upon job seekers. The new measure, called the Plan d’aide et de retour à l’emploi, or 
PARE, made a person’s benefits contingent upon a signed agreement with the national 
employment office to undergo a supervised job search (the Projet d’action personalisé, 
or PAP).
Because the management of France’s unemployment insurance system is bi- rather than 
tripartite, the social partners were able to negotiate the original deal relatively free from 
direct state interference, though they still needed the government to ratify the agree-
ment. Labor Minister Martine Aubry initially refused to do so, arguing that the state 
should retain the prerogative to determine benefit levels and bitterly resenting the so-
cial partners’ arrogation of authority. After protracted negotiations, the conflict was 
resolved through Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s personal appeal to MEDEF’s president. 
Jospin felt compelled to intervene personally in order to preserve the government’s le-
gitimacy as an agent of reform and, equally important, to keep MEDEF from leaving the 
16 This and all subsequent translations from the French and German are the author’s. 
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administration of France’s social-security funds, which the association had repeatedly 
threatened to do if its priorities were not incorporated into the final reform. This would 
have been a major political blow to a government wishing to preserve the appearance 
of consensus over labor-market reform and to one increasingly vulnerable to criticisms 
that it was not doing enough to address unemployment. The government’s acquiescence 
represented the growing influence of the social partners, whose mutual antagonism was 
overshadowed by their shared conceptions of labor-market reform and their distrust of 
the state that had both long excluded them from influence and failed spectacularly to 
reform France’s labor market. 
After 2002, the continuing erosion of the state’s hegemony forced the center-Right ad-
ministrations of Prime Ministers Jean-Pierre Raffarin and Dominique de Villepin to 
compete with the social partners over the direction of labor-market reform. In 2002–
2003, Raffarin’s government acted on a campaign promise to liberalize the previous 
administration’s laws creating a 35-hour week, which had been imposed by the govern-
ment with union support but had also included many initial concessions to employ-
ers.17 Though Raffarin’s reforms of these laws remained quite modest in the face of 
trade-union opposition, employers kept up the pressure for reform in other areas. For 
example, MEDEF launched an aggressive public campaign designed to compel the gov-
ernment to address the thorny issue of youth unemployment. This campaign resulted 
in an accord with the unions over reforms of the vocational-training system, on which 
observers have long blamed the high rate of joblessness among French workers under 
the age of 25 and which had languished for years without any substantive reform. This 
accord was folded into a May 2004 law that created an “individual right to training” 
in the hopes of creating a better match between workers’ skills and employers’ needs 
(Montalembert 2004: 57). Though not radical in its own right, this reform did reflect a 
broader shift in prevailing understandings of labor-market governance and the state’s 
role in regulating it.
After taking power in May 2005, the administration of Prime Minister de Villepin bat-
tled with unions and employers over control of the agenda for reforming the labor 
market. The government’s most controversial measure was the so-called Contrat pre-
mière embauche, or “Contract for First Hires,” which loosened restrictions for small and 
medium-sized enterprises on firing workers under the age of 26 in the hopes of spur-
ring job creation. Though employers tepidly supported the measure, all major unions 
and many student groups vigorously opposed what they saw as a way of increasing the 
precariousness of employment. These groups organized a series of demonstrations in 
March and April 2006 that brought more than a million people out into the streets over 
a period of several weeks. Many demonstrations turned violent and resulted in dozens 
of arrests and significant property damage in Paris and other major cities. The scale of 
17 The 35-hour laws were adopted under the Leftist government of Lionel Jospin in 1998 and 2000. 
Employers’ protests centered on the government’s impositional approach rather than the laws’ 
substance, much of which they privately supported. See Vail (2005, ch. 5).
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the protests and pressure from President Jacques Chirac eventually forced the Prime 
Minister to withdraw the measure, crippling him politically. Though different from the 
substantive influence of MEDEF and the CFDT in previous policy episodes, unions’ 
capacity to channel public hostility to the CPE shows the constraints on state authority 
in a climate of economic austerity. In this way, the CPE’s failure suggests that the pattern 
of “competitive interventionism” is not a partisan phenomenon, but rather character-
izes a broader shift in the dynamics of French politics, irrespective of a government’s 
ideological orientation.
This new pattern marks a major departure from the traditional dynamics of French 
statist labor-market governance. Rather than merely responding to government pro-
posals – either with support or hostility – as in the past, French unions and employers 
are also taking the initiative in a wide range of policy areas, working both to shape the 
content of policy outcomes and to influence the reform agenda and the character of 
political debate. As the economic context has shifted during the past two decades, an 
emerging coalition among moderate unions and employers has been unwilling to leave 
the business of policy making to the state. At the same time, other, “negative” coalitions 
have arisen to block measures that the French electorate sees as fundamental violations 
of the French social contract. Though newly elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
has promised a new period of reform and far-reaching change in the French political 
economy, the government’s ambitious agenda also promises to elicit strong reactions 
and attempts to influence the content of reforms by both unions and business. Gone are 
the days when the French state functions as the sole impetus for labor-market reform, 
and the CFDT and MEDEF, in particular, are likely to continue to exert a powerful in-
fluence over the character of debates and the substance of reform outcomes. Changes in 
both recent labor-market policies and the political bargains underpinning them are the 
cumulative products of a long period of gradual, incremental readjustment of a policy-
making model to a new set of political and economic circumstances. Though France 
has not fully liberalized its labor market, it has undergone a paradigmatic shift since 
the 1980s, in terms of both the degree of public acceptance of partial liberalization and 
prevailing understandings of the state’s role in the process.
As in France, the shift in economic context has also led to significant changes in the 
postwar model of politics in Germany, where the neocorporatist, consensual patterns of 
the 1960s have given way to a much more conflictual environment and a more influen-
tial role for the state. This change has been driven by both the failure of neocorporat-
ist solutions to reduce unemployment (notably the ill-fated Bündnis für Arbeit) and a 
shift in the orientation of German governments, with the state adopting a much more 
asser tive posture, devising reforms with limited input from either unions or employers, 
and even unilaterally implementing measures of its own devising. As in France, recent 
political conflict in Germany has been about more than the content of specific reforms. 
Equally at stake has been the implicit distribution of political authority and control over 
the reform agenda. As German policy makers have confronted slow growth and high un-
employment, and the social partners have failed to manage the process of labor-market 
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adjustment, the state has pushed through some far-reaching reforms that have both 
changed the character of the German labor market and reflected a broad and durable 
shift in the dynamics of German political bargaining. As I detail below, the emergence 
of the German state as a force for reform contradicts well-worn images of a consensual, 
gradualist Germany, with a “semi-sovereign” state that follows rather than leads.
“Conflictual corporatism” and the rise of the German state
Like its French statist counterpart, the German neocorporatist model was well suited 
to the postwar period of economic prosperity. The model was characterized by divided 
political authority, regularized patterns of negotiation among governments, unions, and 
employers, and broad agreement between the state, the social partners, and major po-
litical parties over key questions of policy. This system of shared political authority and 
responsibility was both supportive of and supported by the postwar climate of rapid 
growth, low unemployment, ample tax revenues, and moderately rising wages (Katzen-
stein 1987; Shonfield 1969; Thelen 1991). Unions and employers played central roles 
in administering labor-market policy, and governments rarely pursued major policy 
initiatives over the objections of major producer groups and the political opposition. 
Reforms tended to be incremental, both because agreement was sought from all key 
political stakeholders and because the climate of economic prosperity required little in 
the way of major policy change. In this way, economic prosperity reinforced the model’s 
consensual, gradualist tendencies, based upon an institutional framework characterized 
by decentralized authority and multiple veto points.
The advent of austerity in the 1970s initiated, and the shock of German reunification 
greatly accelerated, changes in the system’s political dynamics, as both policy makers 
and the social partners confronted an unprecedented disruption of the cozy postwar 
consensus. As unemployment rates and budget deficits ballooned in the 1990s, the pub-
lic grew increasingly impatient with what was perceived as governmental hesitation 
and inaction. No longer able to reap equitable portions of a growing economic pie, 
unions and employers began to dig in their heels to defend their (increasingly mutually 
antagonistic) interests in the wake of economic decline, rather than working together 
to promote reform. As Germany’s economic problems worsened, the social partners 
evolved, both in public perception and in reality, from conservative stewards of suc-
cessful social-policy and labor-market arrangements into entrenched defenders of the 
status quo. Despite government efforts to encourage reform under the auspices of the 
Federal Labor Office, or Bundesanstalt (now Bundesagentur für Arbeit or BA), and to 
liberalize wage-setting procedures to promote job creation, the social partners failed 
to reform what had become deeply dysfunctional arrangements. Perhaps the clearest 
example of such failure was the ill-fated Bündnis für Arbeit, or “Alliance for Jobs,” which 
was a loose tripartite forum that aimed to facilitate discussion among the social part-
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ners on labor-market reform. Little was accomplished by the organization, which was 
dissolved in 2003 after both the public and the government recognized the futility of 
pursuing reform through traditional tripartite channels and the unwillingness of the 
social partners to bargain in good faith over labor-market adjustment.
Recent German governments have responded to this political impasse and mounting 
public demands to address the country’s economic woes by taking a much more aggres-
sive role in formulating and implementing reforms. This shift away from neocorporatist 
gradualism and towards a more impositional style marked by growing political con-
flict was particularly evident under the Social Democratic administration of Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder. Recognizing the failure of traditional tripartite labor-market regula-
tion and frustrated by the social partners’ failure to implement significant reforms of 
the labor market, Schröder’s government introduced a number of significant measures, 
usually with limited input from either the social partners or the political opposition. 
Bypassing the regular channels of neocorporatist policy making, these reforms reflected 
a broader shift in authority away from the social partners and towards the federal gov-
ernment. Although the social partners have retained significant authority over German 
labor-market administration, the state began to punch its political weight, becoming a 
leader rather than a follower in the process of formulating and implementing reform.
The emergence of this pattern of “conflictual corporatism” began under CDU Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl but accelerated when Schröder took office in 1998. Having made 
the reduction of unemployment one of his central campaign promises, Schröder and 
Labor Minister Walter Riester launched a series of important initiatives that focused on 
the “rights and obligations” of the unemployed. Since the immediate postwar period, 
unemployment insurance, for which workers furnish 50 percent of the financing, had 
been considered a benefit paid for in advance and therefore owed as a matter of right. By 
contrast, both the rhetoric and the policies of the government suggested a new interpre-
tation of the notion of economic “rights” that called this venerable sense of entitlement 
sharply into question.
One of the administration’s early initiatives in this interventionist vein was the JOB-
AQTIV-Gesetz, or law for “Job Activation, Qualification, Training, Investment, and 
Placement.” This law mandated the restructuring of the BA’s job-placement services 
and adopted an aggressive, contractual stance toward the unemployed in the hopes of 
cutting unemployment. Regional and local branches of the BA were ordered to create a 
personalized profile for each job seeker and to provide individually tailored counseling 
services. The unemployed were obligated to accept “reasonable” job offers and to make 
a sustained effort to find work. The law also introduced new vocational programs, ex-
panded subsidies to encourage hiring, and instituted additional job-creation schemes 
(SPD und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2001). 
The government’s strategy also entailed a concerted effort to tackle the stubborn prob-
lem of youth unemployment, which, as in France, reflected a systemic failure to adapt to 
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a changing economy and the emergence of a new occupational landscape.18 The cam-
paign was emblematic of the federal government’s efforts to occupy the political space 
created by the failures of neocorporatist labor-market institutions. The keystone mea-
sure was the 1998 Sofortprogramm zum Abbau der Jugendarbeitlosigkeit, or “Immediate 
Program for the Reduction of Youth Unemployment” (“JUMP”), which created new 
training and apprenticeship instruments, introduced wage subsidies for firms that hire 
young workers, and reformed job-counseling services for young workers. The federal 
government provided the bulk of funding for the measure and was chiefly responsible 
for its administration and implementation, in contrast to the traditionally tripartite 
character of German labor-market administration.
The key role played by the state in implementing these reforms paralleled the increas-
ing centralization of labor-market policy financing in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 
1999, the government financed a full 29 percent of the total cost of DM 150.3 billion 
(€ 76 billion) for all labor-market policies, compared to € 16.2 billion in 1995. In 2001, 
it furnished an additional DM 1.2 billion (€ 614 million) to compensate the BA for the 
costs of the JUMP reform. During the same period, the BA’s outlays for active labor-
market policies also increased, by DM 44.1 billion (€ 22.5 billion) in 2001 despite a 
decline in the number of unemployed during the year. In 2002, the federal government 
supplied 29 percent of the BA’s annual funding, more than a third of which was paid as a 
lump sum to cover the agency’s deficit.19 From 1998 to 2002, the government increased 
total funding for labor-market policies, while the share of funds spent on active labor-
market policies rose from 34.6 percent to 43.6 percent (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 2001: 
9). Between 2003 and 2006, the federal government’s expenditures on labor-market 
policies more than doubled, reaching a high of € 38.7 billion, before declining slightly 
to € 33.4 billion in 2007 due to renewed economic growth (Streeck 2007: 14).
Growing state intervention has also taken the form of the introduction of new labor-
market regulations and the liberalization of existing ones, such as laws governing em-
ployees’ rights to part-time employment. A January 2001 reform, for example, enabled 
employees unilaterally to convert their full-time jobs into part-time ones (OECD 2001: 
69–70). This reform aimed to reduce unemployment by increasing the flexibility of labor 
contracts (M. Dörnmann, personal communication, November 23, 2000). While unions 
were pleased with the law, employers objected to what they saw as the state’s intrusion 
into the domain of wage contracts, which the established principle of Tarif autonomie, or 
“free collective bargaining,” had traditionally reserved to the social partners. For many, 
the Schröder government’s intrusion in this area was typical of its “top-down” approach 
18 Joblessness among workers under 25 reached 10.4 percent in 1998, 476,000 youth being without 
either jobs or apprenticeship places (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1999: 69, 72). 
19 The federal government is required to cover the BA’s deficit. Traditionally an exceptional mea-
sure for difficult years, this supplement had become a fixture by the late 1990s. Buoyed by ac-
celerated economic growth and ongoing labor-market reforms, the BA is enjoying a surplus in 
2007 for the first time in more than a decade.
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and represented a threat to established models of social partnership (J. Kemme/V. Han-
sen, personal communications, 29 November 2000 and 25 May 2001).
One of the most telling examples of the new political dynamic came with the govern-
ment’s assumption of greater control over the BA in the wake of a series of scandals 
within the organization and its long-standing failure to reduce unemployment. In 2002, 
it was revealed that the BA had falsified its placement record in as many as 70 percent of 
cases, highlighting the ineffectiveness and self-serving character of traditional neocor-
poratist labor-market institutions. The scandal led to the resignation of BA President 
Bernhard Jagoda and inaugurated a period of major reforms of the agency’s admin-
istration. In March 2002, the government created a board appointed directly by the 
federal government to govern the BA. It then shifted responsibility for formulating the 
future direction of labor-market reform from the BA to the newly established Hartz 
Commission. The Commission’s recommendations also reinforced the growing role of 
the state in labor-market policy. For instance, it called for increased state funding for ac-
tive labor-market policies, the development of state-run job agencies to promote more 
flexible employment, and reforms of the BA’s placement services (Hartz 2002). 
Between 2002 and 2005, the Red-Green coalition under Schröder intensified its efforts 
to revitalize the labor market with a series of reforms that went well beyond the rela-
tively modest scope of the initial Hartz reforms. Collectively labeled “Agenda 2010,” a 
far-reaching series of measures aimed to promote job creation by reducing non-wage 
labor costs, introduced further reforming job-placement and training programs, and 
liberalized regulations on shop opening hours and layoffs. In an effort to encourage 
the unemployed to find work, the reforms reduced the length of eligibility for primary 
unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld) to twelve months for workers under age 
55. Furthermore, unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), paid to workers whose 
eligibility for unemployment insurance had expired was reduced to the level of Sozial-
hilfe, the basic German anti-poverty program. The reforms also liberalized protections 
against layoffs in Germany’s smallest firms, loosened the country’s notoriously strict 
laws on shop hours, and cut tax rates.20 Agenda 2010 changed many aspects of the Ger-
man labor market, and it did so with very limited input from either the social partners 
or the political opposition.21 Though these reforms elicited sharp protests from signifi-
cant segments of the population, and indeed led to massive protests in major German 
cities, they also both reflected and capitalized on broad public frustration with the paro-
chialism of the social partners and failed attempts such as the Bündnis für Arbeit to ac-
complish reform through traditional neocorporatist channels. When asked in July 2003 
if they supported the direction of the Agenda 2010 reforms, for instance, 59 percent of 
Germans agreed, with only 14 percent opposed (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach 
2003: 4).
20 Many Agenda 2010 reforms had been proposed by the Hartz Commission and were later sub-
sumed under the broader aegis, which included proposals for reform in other policy areas. 
21 They also sparked extensive public protests in 2004 and undermined the SPD’s performance in 
the 2005 elections.
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The current CDU-SPD “Grand Coalition” led by Chancellor Angela Merkel has strug-
gled to maintain the reform momentum generated by the Red-Green coalition. Though 
their political credibility depends in large part upon their handling of the unemploy-
ment issue, the CDU and SPD have developed different conceptions of reform, and any 
resulting measures will probably represent the narrow middle ground between their 
respective priorities. The administration’s record to date has been mixed, with ambi-
tious reform proposals resulting in relatively modest reform outcomes. For example, a 
widely touted health reform was diluted in response to opposition from doctors and the 
SPD, and tax reforms have been tepid at best, with the best known measure increasing 
the rate of VAT in order to reduce pressures on payroll taxes.
The paucity of ambitious reforms by the current administration, however, would seem 
to represent an anomaly in the recent pattern of growing state intervention that has 
resulted from the inclusion of both major parties in the government, rather than a 
qualitative change in the pattern itself. Once the current government (the only Grand 
Coalition since 1969) falls and new elections place one of the two major parties clearly 
in charge, the same economic pressures and political incentives that gave rise to the 
shift in policy-making dynamics under Schröder are likely to lead to a more impo-
sitional posture on the part of the state and intensified political conflict between the 
government and producer groups. Indeed, current battles within the coalition over the 
introduction of a minimum wage and expansion of long-term care benefits already 
point in this direction, with the SPD privately hoping to use the CDU’s ostensible in-
transigence on these questions as a major campaign issue in 2009 (Peter Jülicher, per-
sonal communication, June 19, 2007). Not only have reforms of the BA significantly 
eroded the social partners’ authority over labor-market policy, but public demands that 
the government reduce unemployment and the discrediting of the tripartite system of 
labor-market governance will provide few incentives for policy makers to revert to the 
older incrementalist pattern. As in France, the climate of economic austerity has shifted 
the incentives facing German governments and other key political actors, as well as 
their understanding of their own interests. These shifts have led to both a qualitative 
change in the dynamics of prevailing political relationships and a shift in the effective 
distribution of political authority, replacing the older model of consensual gradualism 
with a newer pattern of politics in which the state is punching its weight and the social 
partners have lost significant influence.22
22 The battle over the creation of a minimum wage during the summer of 2007 is a case in point. 
Though CDU opposition prevented the SPD from instituting a unified statutory minimum 
wage, the compromise reached between the SPD and CDU represents an erosion of the prin-
ciple of Tarifautonomie and a significant intrusion of the state into the wage-setting process.
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Conclusion: Institutional analysis and political contingency
Since the mid-1990s, both France and Germany have undertaken major reforms of their 
labor-market policies, with the traditional reliance upon “passive” policies such as un-
employment insurance and early-retirement programs giving way to an emphasis on 
labor-market activation. This shift in labor-market strategy has entailed three major 
components. First, authorities have increased workers’ incentives to seek out and accept 
available work. Second, they have promoted job creation by subsidizing employers and 
expanding state-financed employment schemes. Third, they have significantly liberal-
ized labor-market regulations, such as restrictions on overtime and part-time and fixed-
time contracts. In contrast to prevailing images of “frozen” and sclerotic continental 
labor markets incapable of confronting the challenges of globalization and economic 
austerity (for example, Ferrera/Rhodes 2000; Esping-Andersen 1996), French and Ger-
man policy makers have actually been quite active in reforming their labor markets.
These changes in labor-market policies and institutions have been both sculptor and 
sculpture of shifts in the operating dynamics of the French and German political sys-
tems. No longer the paragon of statism portrayed by “national-models” scholarship, 
French politics has evolved into a more nuanced pattern of “competitive intervention-
ism.” In this new model, the state and social partners are each playing important roles in 
shaping the substance of policy and are competing for dominance of the reform agenda. 
Likewise, Germany has witnessed the erosion of the cozy political consensus among 
producer groups and the relatively quiescent state that dominated the boom period of 
the 1950s and 1960s. In its place has emerged a pattern of what I call “conflictual corpo-
ratism,” involving a more aggressive state and an erosion of the traditional dominance 
of labor-market governance by unions and employers’ associations. As the economic 
climate has darkened, the political incentives facing the state and the social partners 
have changed dramatically, as have their respective understandings of the imperatives of 
reform and the constellation of political and economic interests in which they operate. 
Over time, long-term mass unemployment has discredited the models of labor-market 
regulation inherited from the postwar boom and has led previously marginal actors to 
conclude that they stand to benefit politically and economically from policy activism. 
Supported by shifts in public opinion that are more supportive of reform and respond-
ing to mounting political pressures to reduce unemployment, the German state and 
French social partners have become more aggressive in pushing an agenda of labor-
market liberalization supported by the deployment of significant public resources. At 
the same time, previously dominant actors – the French state and German social part-
ners – can no longer credibly claim that their defense of inherited arrangements serves 
the public weal, and political payoffs are increasingly tied to their being perceived as 
responsible stewards of moderate reform. This shift in incentives and interpretations, 
driven in part by failed attempts at labor-market adjustment under inherited models, 
has in turn provided renewed impetus to reform and led to a reconfiguration of bar-
gaining structures in the two countries.
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These changes in labor-market strategies have led to broader shifts in the prevailing dy-
namics of policy making by supporting the emergence of new reform coalitions, which 
have replaced the traditional postwar alliances of business and the political Right, on the 
one hand, and unions and the political Left, on the other. As the prosperity of the 1960s 
gave way to the penury of the post-1970 period, these alliances, with common attitudes 
toward the market and capitalism (acceptance or enthusiasm on the Right, skepticism 
or hostility on the Left), have been replaced by coalitions of moderate unions, elements 
of the business community, and governments of the post-Marxist Left or moderate 
(but not neoliberal) Right. Prompted by the failure of salient promises of reform under 
older arrangements (the defunct Bündnis für Arbeit in Germany and Chirac’s unrealized 
promises to heal France’s “social fracture”), these actors have come together to promote 
reform and to defend their new understandings of their economic interests by remedy-
ing some of the employment traps in the two countries’ Bismarckian systems of welfare 
capitalism, even as they have sought to benefit politically by exerting greater influence 
over the reform agenda and by painting themselves as agents of reform rather than 
defenders of the dysfunctional status quo. Though incremental when considered indi-
vidually, over time, these changes in the policies and politics of the French and German 
labor markets have amounted to quite significant shifts in both the style and substance 
of labor-market governance in the two countries.
The failure of contemporary scholarship to recognize such shifts in national political 
dynamics derives from a long-standing emphasis in comparative political economy on 
the effects of formal institutional arrangements. From such a perspective, the broad 
stability of postwar political institutions in the advanced industrial world leads to an 
expectation of stability in macro-political relationships, even if these dynamics may 
vary episodically. Though ideal for analyzing the politics of an era with a consistent set 
of challenges, this emphasis on formality and continuity is less well-suited for analyz-
ing the varying political dynamics that such institutional arrangements can produce as 
economic contexts change. Because they focus largely on the effects of formal institu-
tions, “historical” and “rational-choice” institutionalist scholars alike tend to overlook 
the effects of contextual changes on national political dynamics. 
To be sure, this emphasis on formal political institutions and the associated “rules of 
the political game” has long been a source of analytical power in comparative politi-
cal economy. Since the 1960s, scholars have identified the institutional features of the 
“national models” of capitalism that were responsible for creating a period of unprec-
edented economic prosperity and dynamism. Their doing so has enabled a generation 
of scholars to highlight the enduring diversity of national political-economic arrange-
ments in the face of the challenges of globalization and economic austerity (Berger/
Dore 1996). Nonetheless, the postwar models were not eternal, but rather were crea-
tures of the postwar climate of prosperity and the challenges specific to it. Though their 
formal contours have remained fairly stable since the 1970s, the operating dynamics of 
these models have changed in ways that a focus on formal institutional arrangements 
alone cannot uncover.
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Much existing work on political institutions has tended problematically to assume that 
actors’ political strategies can be deduced from the formal, constitutional characteristics 
of the political system.23 Even recent work that has analyzed institutional change has 
underestimated the extent to which new economic and political contexts can reshape 
prevailing bargaining patterns (cf. Hall/Thelen 2005). This paper has shown that the 
forces molding political relationships are more complex and changeable than many 
scholars recognize. As Douglass North has pointed out, both formal and informal con-
straints “together define the incentive structure of societies and … economies.” Over 
time, these different incentives reshape the “mental models of the actors [which] shape 
choices” (North 1996: 344, 353). In the case of French and German labor-market re-
form, a changed economic environment and the legacies of past politics have altered 
governments’ and producer groups’ understanding of both their political and economic 
interests and of the legitimacy and credibility of both themselves and their interlocutors. 
Both changing interests and changing interpretations, in other words, have reshaped 
the coalitions that underpin national political dynamics.24 Though these changes in key 
actors’ interpretations of their political and economic interests and the coalitions that 
such interpretations underpin have been significant, they have not led to the disman-
tling of existing political institutions, a fact which suggests that some elements of these 
arrangements may be quite durable, despite dramatic shifts in economic context.25 
Identifying changing patterns of bargaining thus offers a challenging agenda for future 
research on how economic context and interpretations of interests can reshape reform 
coalitions across national and policy contexts.
23 Even recent attempts to loosen the prevalent understanding of institutions so as to introduce a 
greater degree of dynamism retain much of this emphasis on formal policies and institutions. 
See, for example, Hall/Thelen (2005). 
24 Culpepper (2005) has recently called for such an “interpretive” turn in comparative political 
economy. His concept of “joint belief shifts,” denoting a situation “when … central strategic ac-
tors within the system are persuaded, collectively, that their old cognitive maps are wrong and 
that they need to devise new ones,” suggests the need to look at political relationships as evolv-
ing patterns rather than merely at formally structured differentials of power.
25 I am indebted to Michel Goyer for this observation.
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